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          Abstract 
The bullwhip effect describes the tendency for the variance of orders in supply chains to increase as one 
moves upstream from consumer demand. Previous research attributes this phenomenon to both 
operational and behavioral causes. We report on a set of laboratory experiments with a serial supply 
chain, using the Beer Distribution Game.  The experimental conditions eliminate all operational causes of 
the bullwhip effect. Nevertheless, we find that the bullwhip effect persists in this setting and offer one 
possible explanation based on coordination risk.  Coordination risk exists when individuals’ decisions 
contribute to a collective outcome and the decision rules followed by each individual are not known with 
certainty, e.g., where managers cannot be sure how their supply chain partners will behave. We conjecture 
that the existence of coordination risk may contribute to bullwhip behavior. We test this conjecture by 
controlling for environmental factors that lead to coordination risk and find these controls lead to 
significant reduction in order oscillations and amplification. Next, we investigate a managerial 
intervention to reduce the bullwhip effect, inspired by our conjecture that coordination risk contributes to 
bullwhip behavior.  While the intervention, holding additional on-hand inventory, does not change the 
existence of coordination risk, we find that it reduces order oscillation and amplification by providing a 
buffer against the endogenous risk of coordination failure. We conclude that the magnitude of the 
bullwhip can be mitigated, but that its behavioral causes appear robust. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite the undoubted benefits of the lean manufacturing and supply chain revolutions of the past decade, 
supply chain instability continues to plague many businesses (Ellram 2010). The consequences include 
excessive inventories, periodic stockouts, poor customer service, and unnecessary capital investment. 
These outcomes have recently been documented in many manufacturing and wholesale sectors of the 
economy (e.g., Aeppel 2010, Dooley et al. 2010).  
Supply chain instability is often attributed, in part, to the bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect refers to 
the tendency for order variability to increase within a supply chain as orders move upstream from 
customer sales to production. Lee et al. (1997) and Sterman (2000) cite evidence of this phenomenon in a 
wide range of industries. Cachon, Randall, and Schmidt (2007) find that the phenomenon is most 
prevalent in wholesale industries and industries with low seasonality.  Chen and Lee (2011) provide a 
detailed analysis of how the level of time aggregation used in measuring the bullwhip effect can influence 
whether the effect is detected or not.  They also provide insight into what level of aggregation is most 
appropriate for capturing the connection between bullwhip behavior and supply chain cost.  
Previous research attributes the bullwhip effect to both operational and behavioral causes. Operational 
causes are structural characteristics that lead rational agents to amplify demand variation.  Examples 
include order batching, gaming due to shortages, price fluctuations caused by promotions, and demand 
signaling due to forecast uncertainty (Lee et al. 1997). These causes have been documented in practice, 
and techniques to eliminate them are now an important part of the tool kit for supply chain management 
(Lee et al. 2004). Behavioral causes, in contrast, emphasize the bounded rationality of decision makers, 
particularly the failure to adequately account for feedback effects and time delays. Specifically, people 
tend to place orders based on the gap between their target inventory level and current on-hand stock, while 
giving insufficient weight to the supply line of unfilled orders (the stock of orders placed but not yet 
received). Prior work demonstrates that the tendency to underweight the supply line is sufficient to cause 
the bullwhip effect in both experimental and real supply chains (e.g., Sterman 1989a, Sterman 2000). 
The goal of this paper is to extend our understanding of the behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect 
by examining how individuals perform when all operational causes of the bullwhip effect are eliminated.  
In the absence of operational causes, any remaining supply chain instability and bullwhip must arise from 
behavioral causes. We test this hypothesis in a baseline experiment, which follows the general protocol of 
the beer distribution game except that demand uncertainty is eliminated by using a constant demand rate 
that is publicly announced to all participants.1 The experimental setup significantly simplifies the 
                                                
1 The standard protocol for the beer game eliminates the need for order batching because there are no fixed ordering costs or quantity discounts. 
Each player orders from and ships to only one other party and production capacity is infinite, eliminating the incentive for gaming in response to 
shortages. Prices are fixed and customer demand is exogenous, eliminating the possibility of promotions and forward buying. In our design, we 
also eliminate demand signaling since demand is constant and known to all participants. 
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decisions participants must make compared to real supply chains as well as prior experimental research, 
by effectively eliminating all previously cited operational causes of the bullwhip effect. Also, because 
demand is fixed at a known and constant rate, there is no need for safety stock, eliminating possible 
cognitive errors in computing the appropriate safety stock level that might occur with a more complex 
demand distribution. Additionally, the system is started in equilibrium, at the optimal on-hand inventory 
level of zero, so there is no need for participants to calculate the optimal transient path to reach an 
equilibrium level of inventory.  
Nevertheless, we find that order oscillation and amplification persist even in this simplified 
environment. Estimation of participants’ decision rules shows that the vast majority underweight the 
supply line of unfilled orders, consistent with prior studies. Post-play questionnaires and participant 
debriefing suggest that many players were unable to predict how their teammates would behave. 
The results suggest that the existence of coordination risk may partly account for the observed 
behavior. Coordination risk exists when individuals in a group environment make independent decisions 
that contribute to the collective outcome and the decision rules followed by each individual are not known 
with certainty. Such uncertainty arises when decision-makers have limited knowledge of, or trust in, their 
partners’ motives or cognitive abilities. This uncertainty may cause decision makers to deviate from 
equilibrium to hedge against the possibility that their partners will not behave optimally.  In real supply 
chains, inventory managers often have limited understanding of each other’s decision rules or local 
incentives. Such uncertainty is particularly likely when the optimal decision rule is not commonly known.  
The next two experiments test the effect of eliminating environmental factors that may lead to 
coordination risk by first creating common knowledge about the optimal ordering policy (experiment 2) 
and then ensuring that all supply chain partners of the focal human subject follow the optimal policy by 
automating their decisions (experiment 3). We find that order oscillation and amplification are 
significantly reduced in these experiments compared with the baseline.  However, the large majority of 
participants continue to underweight the supply line.  
Lastly, in experiment 4 we test a managerial intervention to test our conjecture that coordination risk 
contributes to bullwhip behavior.  While the intervention, providing participants with additional on-hand 
inventory, does not eliminate coordination risk, we find that it reduces order oscillation and amplification 
by providing a buffer against the endogenous risk of coordination failure. The results suggest a new 
purpose for inventory, which we term coordination stock. Coordination stock differs from conventional 
safety stock held to buffer against exogenous uncertainty in demand or deliveries. In contrast, 
coordination stock is inventory held to buffer against strategic uncertainty about the actions of other 
supply chain members. We find that a modest level of coordination stock significantly lowers order 
variability and costs, suggesting a rationale for what may appear to be excess inventory in decentralized 
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supply chains. 
Overall, our results support the role of behavioral causes in the bullwhip effect.  Coordination risk 
and supply line underweighting are likely both present and contribute to deviation from optimal behavior.  
Directly reducing the strategic uncertainty that contributes to coordination risk significantly improves 
performance, although continued supply line underweighting means that oscillation and amplification still 
exist.  Holding coordination stock does not reduce coordination risk directly, but instead alleviates its 
effect, and thus also has a positive effect on performance. That said, supply line underweighting is highly 
robust—it does not vary significantly by supply chain role and is only slightly moderated by the 
experimental treatments.    
We continue in the next section with a brief overview of prior literature and its connection to our 
main hypotheses. Section 3 provides details of the experimental protocol, followed in section 4 by a 
description of the data generated by the experiments and the associated analysis. Section 5 provides a 
general discussion of the results and possible psychological processes behind the behavior we observed.  
Section 6 concludes with potential managerial implications and directions for future research. 
 
2.  Theory Development and Hypotheses 
Our research fits within the growing field of behavioral operations management. This field aims to 
identify, analyze, and fill gaps in understanding between operations theory and actual human behavior. 
Such work requires adapting tools and theories from social science disciplines, such as experimental 
economics, psychology, system dynamics, and organizational behavior. The behavioral operations 
management literature relating to our present study examines inventory ordering decisions in multi-player 
settings, including supply chains. In this stream of research, summarized in Croson and Donohue (2002), 
researchers have focused on estimating individual decision rules for ordering and comparing them with 
optimal rules, e.g., Sterman (1989a, 1989b).  Much of this research has been conducted in the context of 
the beer distribution game. The game is well-suited to examine behavioral issues since it is simple enough 
for people to learn quickly while retaining key features of real supply chains.  
The major difference between our baseline setting (experiment 1) and prior work using the beer 
distribution game is the treatment of customer demand. In previous work, customer demand both varied 
across time periods (i.e., was either stochastic or non-stationary), and was unknown to participants. For 
example, Sterman (1989a) and Steckel et al. (2004) use unknown, non-stationary but deterministic 
demand functions (a step function and S-curve, respectively). Croson and Donohue (2003, 2006) use a 
known, stationary uniform distribution, but agents (other than the retailer) do not know the realizations of 
demand. Due to the order fulfillment delay, agents must forecast future demand. It is conceivable that the 
bullwhip in these settings results, in part, from demand uncertainty and resulting forecasting errors (Chen 
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et al. 2000).  
We eliminate demand variability and forecasting as potential causes of the bullwhip by using a 
constant demand of 4 cases per period and publicly informing participants of this fact before the game 
begins.  When demand is constant and publicly known, there is no need for safety stock.  Further, unlike 
prior studies, we initialize the system in equilibrium so there is no incentive for participants to adjust the 
current stock level.  
By adding these controls, our baseline experiment is designed to test whether the bullwhip effect still 
exists when all operational causes and operational sources of uncertainty are removed. The only 
uncertainty facing participants lies in the decision processes other supply chain team members use to 
make their order decisions.  However, it is trivial to show that costs are minimized when each decision 
maker simply passes through the order they receive. Under this policy, the system remains in equilibrium 
and there is no order oscillation or amplification (i.e., no bullwhip).  Hence, theory suggests: 
Hypothesis 1:  The bullwhip effect (order oscillation and amplification) will not occur when demand is 
known and constant and the system begins in equilibrium. 
This (null) hypothesis implicitly assumes that either coordination risk does not exist or, if it does exist, it 
does not affect ordering behavior.  
The importance of coordination in collective decision settings is well studied in the context of 
coordination games (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1990, 1991, 1993, Cachon and Camerer 1996).  
However, that literature focuses primarily on games with multiple equilibria, in which the failure to 
coordinate causes players to converge to the risk-dominant, instead of the payoff-dominant equilibrium.  
A common goal in that literature, which we share, is to identify and test mechanisms designed to help 
players coordinate. 
Unlike the traditional coordination games, our supply chain setting does not have multiple equilibria.  
The equilibrium is unique, but time delays, accumulations, and feedbacks in the supply chain cause the 
equilibrium to be potentially unstable.  Failure to coordinate may induce instability, oscillation, and other 
disequilibrium dynamics that complicate or prevent a return to equilibrium.  Thus our supply chain setting 
uncovers new aspects of the coordination problem.  In our setting, coordination risk may arises from two 
factors: (1) a lack of common knowledge about the decision rule that keep the system in equilibrium, and 
(2) a lack of trust that the other players will implement that rule even if it is commonly known.    
The concept of common knowledge originated in game theory (Aumann 1976) and is considered a 
necessary component of equilibrium in games. Vanderschraaf and Sillari (2005) provide a comprehensive 
description of the concept and its history in academic research. Agents often act on the basis of 
incomplete information; decision makers must always determine what they know and what they do not 
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know before making a decision. When the outcome involves more than one agent, each decision maker 
must also consider what others may know. Common knowledge goes beyond mutual knowledge. Under 
mutual knowledge, each agent privately knows the same information. In our case, this information would 
be the optimal ordering policy. Mutual knowledge is typically implemented in the lab by privately 
informing all participants about relevant information. Common knowledge goes a step further by 
requiring not only that agents know the information but that they also know that all the other players also 
know this information. In addition, players know that other players also know that everyone knows this 
information and so on ad infinitum. Common knowledge is typically implemented in the laboratory by 
publicly providing the relevant information to participants. After the public announcement, everyone 
knows that everyone else has been informed, etc. 
Game-theoretic models and experimental studies show that failures of common knowledge can lead 
to coordination failures and inefficient outcomes in a variety of settings (e.g., Geanakoplos 1992, Lei, 
Noussair, and Plott 2001, Nagel 1995). We contribute to this literature by testing the effect of creating 
common knowledge on reducing bullwhip behavior, which is a natural outcome of reducing coordination 
risk. If the bullwhip is caused or triggered by coordination risk, then providing common knowledge may 
reduce both order variability and amplification (compared to the baseline experiment).  This leads to our 
first hypothesis concerning coordination risk. 
Hypothesis 2:  The provision of common information through the announcement of the optimal policy 
will reduce the bullwhip effect (order oscillation and amplification). 
Also, since the description of the optimal policy explicitly directs participants to consider both on-hand 
and on-order inventory, theory suggests that decision-making at the individual level may improve by 
leading agents to fully account for the supply line. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3: The provision of common information through the announcement of the optimal policy will 
reduce supply line underweighting.   
The second element of coordination risk is trust that other agents will actually carry out the optimal 
ordering policy.  While others have studied the effect of a lack of common knowledge on experimental 
outcomes, they have used settings sufficiently simple that trust is typically not an issue (see Ochs 1995 
for a review).  A large literature in economics and organizational behavior examines the effect of trust in 
others’ benign intentions (see, e.g. Rousseau et al., 1998). Here, however, we focus not on intentions but 
on trust in the ability of other players to implement optimal decisions correctly.  The closest previous 
research investigating this type of trust is Schwieren and Sutter (2008), who compare individuals’ trust in 
others’ good intentions toward them with trust in others’ abilities.   
If our explanation for the cause of order oscillation and amplification in the baseline is correct, 
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eliminating the possibility of coordination failure should eliminate (or at least significantly reduce) order 
oscillation and amplification.  Overall supply chain performance will improve by definition, since the 
automated agents play optimally. The relevant comparison is thus how well the human players perform 
here compared with the retailers from previous experiments, who face the same incoming order stream. 
With the guarantee that all others will play optimally, the performance of the human players should 
improve significantly, and we should see less order oscillation. 
Hypothesis 4:  Eliminating coordination risk will decrease order oscillation for the human players, 
relative to the retailers in the (a) baseline and (b) common knowledge experiments. 
Finally, since the supply line is now more predictable, it should be easier to track. Also, freed of the 
need to devote scarce cognitive resources to anticipating how their teammates will behave, individuals 
may be more likely to use the optimal policy and fully account for the supply line.  Hence 
Hypothesis 5:  Eliminating coordination risk will reduce supply line underweighting.  
Following a common goal of prior coordination research, it is valuable to consider what mechanisms 
could be used to mitigate the effects of coordination risk when the source of the risk itself cannot be 
removed.  One possible policy intervention is to hold excess inventory to buffer against the interaction 
effects caused by the possible sub-optimal decisions made by other supply chain members.  Such a 
stabilizing benefit has been suggested by others (e.g., Cohen and Baganha 1998), but never tested in an 
experimental setting. Previous research has identified operational factors affecting the optimal level of 
safety stock, including the length of the replenishment lead-time, level of demand variability, and the 
relative cost of holding inventory versus carrying a backlog.  These are the common inputs used to 
manage inventory levels in most continuous or periodic review inventory systems (Zipkin 2000).  Our 
research contributes to this literature by testing a new role for excess inventory—to buffer against 
strategic uncertainty about other players’ decisions (as opposed to exogenous uncertainty about market 
demand, production lags or other operational factors). 
Additional on-hand inventory may improve performance for two reasons. First, initializing the system 
with positive on-hand inventory reduces the need for players who seek a buffer stock to increase orders 
above equilibrium, reducing the incidence and magnitude of deviations that may trigger the instability 
caused by supply line underweighting. Second, initial on-hand inventory reduces the likelihood that the 
system will enter the unstable backlog regime, moderating the oscillations generated by players who 
underweight the supply line. Hence, 
Hypothesis 6: Excess initial inventory will decrease the bullwhip effect (order oscillation and 
amplification). 
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On the other hand, because excess inventory necessarily initializes the system out of inventory 
equilibrium, the behavior of the other members of the supply chain may actually be more difficult to 
predict a priori. Rational agents would attempt to reduce their inventory levels, but if they or their supply 
chain partners underweight the supply line, the result could be instability and oscillations, perhaps even 
larger than those observed in the baseline experiment.  Such behavior would refute Hypothesis 6.   
 
3.    Experimental Design 
Our experiments follow the standard protocol for the Beer Distribution Game. The experiments were run 
using a computer network with an interface written in Visual Basic. Complete instructions are available in 
an on-line supplement.2  All sessions were conducted at a large public university in the Northeastern 
United States in the spring semester of 2003.  
The Beer Distribution Game consists of four agents (retailer, wholesaler, distributor and factory), 
each making ordering decisions for one link in a serial supply chain with exogenous final customer 
demand (Figure 1). The chain operates as a multi-echelon inventory system in discrete time with demand 
backlogging, infinite capacity, and both order processing and shipping lags (see Chen 1999 and Clark and 
Scarf 1960 for classic models of such systems). Each period (corresponding to one week) all players 
experience the following sequence of events: (1) shipments from the upstream decision-maker are 
received and placed in inventory, (2) incoming orders are received from the downstream decision-maker 
and either filled (if inventory is available) or placed in backlog, and (3) a new order is placed and passed 
to the upstream player. Croson and Donohue (2006) and Sterman (1989a) provide full details. 
As in most previous studies, the retailer, wholesaler, and distributor (R, W, D) face a two week lag 
between placing an order and fulfillment by their immediate supplier, and an additional two week 
transportation lag between fulfillment by the supplier and delivery (a total lag of 4 weeks, assuming the 
supplier is in stock). The factory (F) has a one-week lag between placing orders (setting the production 
schedule) and production starts, and a two-week production lag (a total lag of 3 weeks). As in earlier 
studies, costs are $0.50/week for each unit held in inventory, and $1/week for each unit backlogged. 
We eliminated demand variability and forecasting as potential causes of the bullwhip in all four 
experiments by using a constant demand of 4 cases per week and publicly informing participants of this 
fact before the game began. Further, the realization of demand each week (4 cases) was displayed on 
every agent’s screen at all times, confirming visually that demand is indeed constant. After the rules were 
explained, but before play began, participants were given a quiz to confirm they understood the rules and 
calculations, as well as the fact that customer demand would be constant at 4 cases per week for the entire 
game.  All participants correctly answered these questions, confirming that they understood the rules and 
                                                
2Instructions, the quiz and other materials can be found at www.personal.psu.edu/exk106/Appendix_Compendium_Instructions.pdf. 
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operation of the game.   
 
Figure 1:  The Beer Distribution Game portrays a serial supply chain. 
 
All experiments began in flow equilibrium with orders and shipments of four cases at each delay step. 
The initial end-of-period on-hand stock level (after deliveries are received and orders filled) was set to 
zero for all supply chain levels.   No time limit was imposed for making order decisions during the game. 
All games were run for 48 weeks, although this information was not shared with the participants to avoid 
horizon effects. After the game, but before receiving payment, participants were asked to complete an on-
line questionnaire inviting them to reflect on their experience.  
The four experiments varied in the level of common knowledge of the optimal order policy, the 
automation of supply chain partner decisions, and the initial level of on-hand inventory. Table 1 
summarizes these differences.  In experiment 2 and 3 we provide common knowledge about the optimal 
ordering policy, in addition to common knowledge of customer demand (which is provided in all four 
experiments).  This is accomplished by providing the following public explanation of the optimal policy 
at the beginning of the experiment:  
 “The total team cost can be minimized if all team members place orders so as to make the total 
of their on-hand inventory and outstanding orders equal to a pre-specified target level.  This 
target level is 16 for the retailer, wholesaler and distributor, and 12 for the factory.  This means 
that if the total on-hand inventory and outstanding orders is greater than or equal to the target 
level, the order that minimizes team cost is 0.  But if this total inventory is less than the target 
level, the cost-minimizing order is to order just enough to bring it to the target.” 
 
The explanation was presented in written instructions and explained publicly along with the game rules. 
The explanation places no restrictions on participants’ actions, but the fact that the explanation is public 
provides common knowledge: each player is informed of the cost minimizing policy and knows that 
every other player is also so informed.  
In experiment 3 we further control the possible sources of coordination risk by placing individuals in 
a supply chain with three automated players, each programmed to use the optimal policy.  We ran 4 sets 
of 10 supply chains with each set placing the human decision maker in a different role (i.e., 10 
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experiments with a human retailer, 10 with a human wholesaler, etc.).  Participants are publicly told the 
optimal, cost minimizing, decision rule as in the previous experiment, and also that all other members of 
their supply  chain are automated and programmed to follow that rule.  All other conditions are identical 
to the previous two experiments.  
 
 Experiment 1 
(Baseline) 
Experiment 2 
(Creating Common 
Knowledge) 
Experiment 3 
(Eliminating 
Coordination Risk) 
Experiment 4 
(Adding 
Coordination Stock) 
 
Publicly known and 
constant demand 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Initial on-hand inventory set 
at equilibrium level 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No (set to 12) 
Optimal order rule publicly 
announced 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
One’s fellow supply chain 
members guaranteed to 
follow optimal policy 
(automated) 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
Undergraduate* 90% 94.7% 98.7% 90.7% 
Gender – female 56.9% 31.6% 47.4% 39.5% 
Major – business 55.2% 63.2% 57.9% 72.1% 
Major – science & 
engineering 
15.5% 10.5% 15.8% 9.3% 
Major – liberal arts, 
communications, and 
education 
 
19.0% 
 
21.1% 
 
23.7% 
 
14.0% 
Major – other** 10.3% 5.2% 2.6% 4.6% 
N (individuals) 40 40 40 40 
T (teams) 10 10 40 10 
N and T (minus outliers) 32, 8 40, 10 35, 35 28, 7 
 
* All others are graduate students. 
** Other majors include HDFS, Agricultural Science, IST, EMS, Arts and Architecture, and undecided. 
 
Table 1: Conditions and Demographic Breakdown Across Experiments 
 
Note: Although participants were randomly assigned to experiments ex-ante, we ran t-tests of proportions to check if there are systematic 
differences ex-post in these demographics by experiment.  Out of the 36 comparisons run (each experiment versus each other experiment on each 
dimension reported above) we find only one significant difference (between the proportion of women in the baseline and common knowledge 
experiments).  When running multiple tests, it is not uncommon to get false positive results (in fact, 1 in 20 tests will show a 5% significant 
difference by chance).  In these situations, a Bonferroni correction is typically used. Once this correction is applied this gender difference is no 
longer statistically significant 
 
In experiment 4, conditions are identical to the baseline except that all participants begin with 12 units 
of on-hand inventory rather than the optimal level of zero. Twelve units is the initial inventory 
traditionally used in the beer game, facilitating comparison to prior work, and likely exceeds the desired 
level of coordination stock (as suggested by the estimates of S’ in Table 2).  Our purpose is not to find the 
optimal level of coordination stock, but rather to test whether directionally there is an improvement when 
excess inventory is provided.   
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Table 1 also summarizes participant demographics for each treatment. A total of 160 participants 
were recruited using an on-line recruitment system. All participants were drawn from the same student 
pool and randomly assigned to one of the four treatments. Participants were paid a $5 show-up fee, plus 
up to $20 in bonus money depending on their team’s relative performance. Team performance was 
computed based on total supply chain cost (i.e., the cumulative sum of holding and backorder costs across 
all four players) using the continuous payment scheme introduced by Croson and Donohue (2006).  
We tested the data from each treatment for outliers using the Grubbs procedure (Grubbs 1969). A 
small number of outliers were found and deleted from the statistical analyses reported in the main text 
(the Appendix details the treatment of outliers). Eliminating the outliers reduces the between-condition 
differences, an a fortiori procedure that provides a tougher test of our hypotheses. For completeness, we 
also report results using the entire data set (i.e., including outliers) in footnotes. All our findings hold at 
similar levels of significance with or without outliers. 
4.   Experimental Results  
4.1 Experiment 1:  Baseline with Constant Demand  
Figure 2 shows orders and on-hand inventory for each individual in our baseline experiment. The 
characteristic pattern of oscillation and amplification observed in prior research persists. None of the 
teams remain close to the equilibrium throughput of 4 cases/week. Excluding outliers, factory orders 
average 19; the mean of the peak factory orders is 215 and the maximum factory order is 500.  
Figure 3 displays the standard deviations of orders for each role across the eight teams in our data 
analysis (teams 4 and 9 were identified as outliers and excluded).  Significant order oscillation clearly 
exists despite constant demand and common knowledge of that fact. We use a nonparametric sign test to 
check for order amplification (Seigel 1965, p. 68).  Order amplification exists when the standard deviation 
of the ith stage in the supply chain, σi, exceeds that of its immediate customer, σi–1 (where i ∈ {R, W, D, 
F}). If there were no bullwhip, we would observe σi > σi–1 at the chance rate of 50%. The data reveal σi > 
σi–1 for 79% of the cases, rejecting H1 at p = 0.0025.3  The bullwhip effect persists even when customer 
demand is constant and publicly known to all participants.4 
4.1.1  Individual Ordering Behavior 
To better understand the decision processes of the participants, we specify a decision rule for managing 
inventory and estimate its parameters for each participant. Comparing the estimated decision weights to 
the optimal weights offers insight into participant decision-making. 
                                                
3  Including the outlier teams (4 and 9), σi > σi–1 for 80% of the cases, and H1 is rejected at p = 0.0005.  
4 To test the robustness of our results to the use of the standard deviations of orders as the metric, we also analyzed the root mean squared (RMS) 
deviation, δ, of orders, O, from the steady-state optimal value of 4, δi, j = (1/n)[Σt∈{1, 48}(Oi,j,t – 4)2]1/2 for role i in team j.  The RMS deviation 
penalizes participants for all deviations from optimal, and not only for variability around the participant’s mean orders. All statistical results 
reported here continue to hold using the RMS deviation from optimal instead of the standard deviation.   
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Figure 2.  Orders (top) and On-Hand Inventory (bottom) for the 10 teams in Experiment 1 (Baseline). 
Negative inventory values indicate backlogs.  Note:  vertical scales differ across teams.   
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Figure 3:  Standard Deviation of Orders in Experiment 1 (Baseline). 
Following Sterman (1989a) we estimate the following decision rule for orders  placed in week t 
by the person in role i:  
   
where CO is expected Customer Orders (orders expected from the participant’s customer next period), 
is desired inventory, S is actual on-hand inventory (net of any backlog), and SL is the supply line of 
unfilled orders (on-order inventory). Orders are modeled as replacement of (expected) incoming orders 
modified by an adjustment to bring inventory in line with the target. 
The parameter α is the fraction of the inventory shortfall or surplus ordered each week. The 
parameter β is the fraction of the supply line the participant considers. The optimal value of β is 1, since  
participants should include on-order as well as on-hand inventory when assessing their net inventory 
position. Given β = 1, the optimal value of α is also 1: since there are no adjustment costs, participants 
should order the entire inventory shortfall each period. The optimal expectation for customer orders in our 
experiment where customer demand is stationary (indeed, constant and known to all participants) is the 
mean of actual orders placed by the final customer, that is, COi,j = 4  cases/week for all sectors i. In this 
case the rule reduces to the familiar order-up-to rule. The parameter  represents the sum of the desired 
on-hand and desired on-order inventory. Since final customer demand is constant and known, desired on-
hand inventory is zero, and desired on-order inventory is the inventory level required to ensure deliveries 
of 4 cases/week given the order fulfillment lead time of 4 weeks (3 for the factory), yielding  = 16 
units (12 for the factory).  
Equation (1) can also be interpreted as a behavioral decision rule based on the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman et al. 1982), in which expected customer 
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orders COi,j represents the anchor (order what you expect your customer to order from you), and 
inventory imbalances motivate adjustments above or below the forecast. To capture the possibility that 
participants do not use the optimal forecast of incoming orders of 4 cases/week, but rather respond to the 
actual orders they receive, we model expected customer orders as formed by exponential smoothing of 
actual incoming orders, IO, with adjustment parameter θi, as in Sterman (1989a), 
    
We use nonlinear least squares to find the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters θi, αi, βi, 
and , subject to the constraints 0 ≤ θi, αi, βi ≤ 1 and  ≥ 0. We estimated the confidence intervals 
around each estimate with the parametric bootstrap method widely used in time series models of this type 
(Efron and Tibshirani 1986, Li and Maddala 1996, Fair 2003), assuming an iid Gaussian error ε with 
variance given by the variance of the observed residuals for each individual, σi2. An ensemble of 500 
bootstrap simulations were computed for each participant, and the 95% confidence intervals for each of 
the four estimated parameters computed using the percentile method. Table 2 summarizes the results.  
 θ  α  β  S’ R2 RMSE 
Experiment 1 (Baseline) 
Median Estimate 0.09 0.47 0.08 4.42 0.54 5.47 
Median Width of 95% Confidence Interval 0.55 0.30 0.29 12.66     
N 24 32 30 30      
Experiment 2 (Common Knowledge) 
Median Estimate 0.08 0.28 0.10 8.26 0.57 2.83 
Median Width of 95% Confidence Interval 0.31 0.22 0.37 10.90     
N 30 40 39 39      
Experiment 3 (Eliminating Coordination Risk) 
Median Estimate 0.00 0.24 0.14 3.48 0.29 1.62 
Median Width of 95% Confidence Interval 0.91 0.30 0.50 7.76     
N 9 27 26 26            
Experiment 4 (Coordination Stock)       
Median Estimate 0.08 0.26 0.24 4.97 0.54 2.53 
Median Width of 95% Confidence Interval 0.40 0.23 0.42 8.01   
N 21 28 27 27    
Median Estimates, Sterman (1989a) 0.25 0.28 0.30 15 0.76 2.60 
N 44 44 40 40   
 
Median Estimates, Croson and Donohue (2002)* N/A 0.22 0.14 N/A 0.71  
N  44 44  44  
Table 2:  Estimated parameters for the ordering decision rule (eq. 1). 
Note that the number N of estimates can differ for each parameter.  N can be smaller than the number of participants in each condition (40) for 
four reasons.  First, outliers are excluded.  Second, θ cannot be identified if incoming orders are constant, which is always true for retailers and 
also true for upstream players if the downstream player always orders 4 cases/week (an occurrence that is more common in exp. 3 where three of 
the four players are automated and play optimally at all times).  Third, none of the parameters can be identified when the human plays optimally 
by ordering 4 cases/week at all times (also more prevalent in exp. 3).  Finally, when the optimal estimate of α = 0, β and S’ are undefined.   
* Croson and Donohue (2002) estimated a slightly different decision rule:  where IO is 
incoming orders and a, b, c, d are estimated. The inventory and supply line weights α and β can be expressed in terms of a and b by interpreting 
cIO as the participant’s demand forecast and noting that the inventory correction term d + aS + bSL = a[(d/a) –(S + (b/a)SL)], implying α = –a 
and β = b/a. 
, , 1 , 1(1 ) (2)i t i i t i i tCO IO COθ θ− −= + −
iS ′ S ′
Oi, t  = Max[0, aiSi,t  + biSLi, t  + ciIOi, t  + di + εi, t ]
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As expected, the uncertainty bounds around θ are large. For many participants, the variance in 
incoming orders is small, and sometimes zero, e.g., when their customer always orders the optimal 
quantity of 4 cases per week. In such cases, the smoothing time constant θ cannot be identified. More 
important are the estimates of α and β. In experiment 1, the median fraction of the inventory shortfall 
corrected each period is 0.47, and the median fraction of the supply line participants consider is 0.08, both 
far below the optimal values of 1. The estimates of α and β are generally tight: 97% of the estimated 
values of α are significantly greater than 0, implying that most participants respond to inventory 
imbalances, as expected. However, 72% are significantly less than the optimal value of 1, implying most 
participants do not use the optimal order-up-to rule but instead order only a fraction of their inventory 
shortfall each period. For β, 80% of the estimates are significantly less than the optimal value of one. 
Further, 60% are not significantly different from zero, and the best estimate of β is zero for 30% of 
participants, indicating that participants tend to underweight or ignore on-order inventory.  
4.1.2.  Discussion 
Contrary to predictions based on traditional assumptions of rationality and common knowledge, the 
bullwhip effect remains even when demand is constant and known to all participants. Constant demand 
and common knowledge of it did not eliminate supply line underweighting. The median estimate of β, the 
fraction of on-order inventory accounted for by the participants, at 0.08, is far below the optimal estimate 
of 1, and estimates of desired total inventory, , are far too small to account for the replenishment lead-
time. The median estimate of  is 4.42 cases, while the optimal value is 16 (12 for the factory). As 
found in Sterman (1989a) and Croson and Donohue (2006), participants substantially underweight the 
supply line and underestimate the replenishment cycle time. Similar to prior studies, there is heterogeneity 
across participants in the estimated parameters.  For example, the estimates of α and β span the full range 
of possible values, [0, 1], and the standard deviation of the set of estimated values is large (0.35 and 0.34, 
respectively).   
Prior work (Thomsen, Mosekilde and Sterman 1992, Mosekilde, Larsen and Sterman 1991, Sterman 
1988) mapped the relationships between the parameters of the decision rule and supply chain 
performance. Although the parameter space is highly nonlinear, supply line underweighting (low β) and 
aggressive ordering (high α) can interact to increase the bullwhip, raise costs, and can produce periodic, 
quasiperiodic, and chaotic behavior.  These studies show that, conditional on supply line underweighting, 
a less aggressive response to inventory discrepancies (lower α) increases stability and lowers costs by 
reducing the gain of the main negative feedback regulating inventory.  In section 5.3 we examine whether 
participants in each of the four experiments, despite significantly underweighting the supply line, placed 
S ′
S ′
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orders in a way that approximates the optimal response to inventory shortfalls conditioned on the degree 
of supply line underweighting they exhibited.  
Post-play questionnaire responses suggest that coordination risk may be contributing to order 
oscillation and amplification.  A number of subjects asserted that while they realized that ordering 4 units 
every period would minimize costs, they didn’t believe their teammates understood or would follow the 
optimal policy. Some explicitly note that this uncertainty caused them to seek additional inventory as 
protection against their teammates’ unpredictable ordering behavior: 
Since I was the retailer it was easy to decide what my inventory should be.  I tried to keep the 
inventory at 4, just in case something happened along the line and I wouldn’t get my supply. 
[Retailer] 
 
“I wanted to have a little extra inventory than what was demanded” [Wholesaler] 
 
“I tried to anticipate incoming orders. [Ordering] 10… would allow an ample buffer in case a 
large order came in.” [Distributor] 
 
“I tried to anticipate what the rest of my teammates were going to order. This was difficult however 
since my teammates’ orders would jump from 6 to 200 and back to 4. I tried to get inventory to help 
but then they stopped making order (sic) and I was screwed.” [Factory] 
 
Uncertainty about the behavior of others motivated these participants to hold additional inventory as a 
buffer against the risk of errors by their teammates. However, the only way a participant can increase on-
hand inventory from the initial level of zero is to temporarily increase orders, thus forcing the supplier 
into an unanticipated backlog situation and, to the extent upstream players underweight the supply line, 
triggering the oscillations we observe.  The questionnaire responses and the persistence of the bullwhip 
effect with constant, publicly known demand are consistent with the conjecture that coordination risk 
contributes to an increase in order oscillations and amplification.   
 
4.2.  Experiments 2 and 3: Reducing Coordination Risk 
Figure 4 reports the results of experiment 2.  Compared to experiment 1 (Figure 3 – which is on a larger 
scale), publicly providing the optimal policy appears to substantially reduce order variability. We use a 
nonparametric two-tailed Mann-Whitney test (also referred to as a Wilcoxon test, see Seigel 1965, p. 116) 
to compare the standard deviations of orders between experiments 1 and 2. The median standard deviation 
of orders falls significantly from the baseline value of 15.7 to 5.4 (Mann-Whitney p = 0.012),5 supporting 
Hypothesis 2. However, the results also show the bullwhip effect is resilient. Orders still oscillate 
(although oscillation is much reduced) and there remains significant amplification in order variability up 
the supply chain (σi >σi-1 for 83% of the cases, p = 0.0001). 
                                                
5 Including outliers also yields significantly higher standard deviation of orders placed in the baseline (median 20.9) compared with those placed 
here (median 5.4), Mann-Whitney p=0.007.  
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    Figure 4:  Order Standard Deviations in Experiment 2 (Creating Common Knowledge) 
 
Interestingly, the tendency to underweight the supply line is not eliminated despite knowledge of the 
optimal policy.  The median fraction of the supply line participants consider in experiment 2 is 0.10, 
substantially below the optimal value of 1. Further, 82% of the estimated values of β are significantly less 
than one, 51% are not significantly different from zero, and zero is the best estimate of β for 21% of the 
participants. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, providing participants with the optimal policy does not reduce 
supply line underweighting. 
 Figure 5 reports the results of experiment 3.  Properly assessing the impact of automating the orders 
of other players (experiment 3) is complicated by the difference in the environment faced by the humans 
in experiment 3. Humans playing the upstream positions (W, D, or F) face no variability in incoming 
orders, since all downstream players are programmed to order the optimal 4 cases per week.6  Thus 
human players in these roles do not experience any unintended inventory changes, unlike their 
counterparts in the previous two experiments, who typically experience large variation in incoming 
orders. In experiments 1 and 2, retailers are the only ones guaranteed to face constant orders.  The impact 
of automation is therefore best examined by comparing the behavior of humans in experiment 3 against 
the behavior of retailers in experiments 1 and 2.  Doing so provides a conservative measure of the impact 
of the treatment, since we would expect more significant differences in the behavior of upstream players 
across treatments. 
                                                
6 While the automated agents are guaranteed to play the optimal strategy, their orders may differ from 4 cases per week if the human player does 
not order optimally. If the human deviates from equilibrium (for any reason), upstream agents experience unintended changes in their inventory, 
requiring them to alter their own orders to correct the imbalance (using the optimal order-up-to rule to do so).  
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Figure 5:  Order Standard Deviations in Experiment 3 (Eliminating Coordination Risk) 
Note: Here participants all make up separate teams (with automated team members) and so we group the data by role rather than team. 
 
 The median standard deviation of the human players’ orders in experiment 3 is 1.7, compared to 3.9 
for retailers in the baseline, a significant difference (Mann-Whitney p = 0.012), supporting Hypothesis 4, 
part (a).7  While the median standard deviation in orders of 1.7 is lower than the value of 2.5 for retailers 
in experiment 2 (common knowledge), the difference is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p = 
0.43).8 Thus the data do not consistently support part (b) of Hypothesis 4.  
Nine of the forty participants in experiment 3 ordered the optimal quantity of 4 cases/week at all 
times.  The parameters of the decision rule cannot be estimated for these subjects.  For the remaining 31 
participants, the median fraction of the supply line participants consider is 0.14, significantly less than the 
optimal value of 1. Supply line underweighting remains robust among these participants despite 
knowledge of the optimal ordering rule and the elimination of coordination risk: 96% of the estimates of 
β are significantly less than the optimal value of one. Hypothesis 5 is, at best, only weakly supported. 
Overall, results from experiments 2 and 3 are consistent with the conjecture that coordination risk is 
one behavioral cause of the bullwhip effect.  When uncertainty in the ordering behavior of one’s supply 
chain partners is reduced (through the introduction of common knowledge of the optimal policy; 
experiment 2) or eliminated entirely (through the additional introduction of trust by guaranteeing others 
will use the optimal policy; experiment 3), order oscillations are significantly lower.  Nevertheless, order 
                                                
7 Including outliers, median standard deviations by baseline retailers is 3.9 while median standard deviations among all human players here is 1.9,  
Mann-Whitney p=0.021.   
8 Including outliers, median standard deviations by retailers with common knowledge is 2.5, while median standard deviations here among all 
human players is 1.9, Mann-Whitney p=0.27.    
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oscillation and amplification are not completely eliminated, and supply-line underweighting persists. 
 
4.3.   Experiment 4: Adding Coordination Stock 
The previous experiments reduce the magnitude of the bullwhip effect by reducing or eliminating 
coordination risk.  However, in the field it is often not practical or possible to create common knowledge 
of the optimal policy, or to guarantee that one’s supply chain partners will follow a particular ordering 
rule.  In such cases, an intervention is needed to mitigate the impact of coordination risk, despite not 
reducing the risk itself.  Figure 6 displays the average standard deviations across all teams for experiment 
4, where excess inventory was introduced as a possible intervention. Order oscillation clearly remains, 
although the addition of coordination stock substantially and significantly dampens variation compared to 
the baseline setting (comparing Figures 3 and 6). The sign test suggests that order amplification still 
exists, but it is only marginally significant (σi > σi–1 in 62% of the cases, differing from the chance rate of 
50% at p = 0.097).9  The median standard deviation of orders placed is 3.8 compared with 15.7 in the 
baseline, a significant difference (Mann-Whitney p = 0.001). Our results thus support hypothesis 6. 
 Managers and researchers recognize that inventory may be held for different reasons.  Inventory held 
because of the need to batch orders to amortize fixed ordering costs is commonly referred to as cycle 
stock.  Inventory used to buffer the effects of process uncertainty (e.g., to prevent starvation between 
work cells) is known as buffer inventory.  Safety stock usually refers to inventory used to buffer against 
the impact of demand or supply uncertainty.  While coordination risk is a contributing factor to demand 
and supply uncertainty, such uncertainty in most inventory models is considered to arise from exogenous 
sources. In contrast, the uncertainty subjects experience here does not arise from the external 
environment—it is self-inflicted.  We introduce the term coordination stock to represent a type of safety 
stock used to buffer against strategic uncertainty in orders or delivery due to coordination risk.  
Coordination stock buffers against decision errors, but does not reduce those errors directly.   
 It is important to note that, all else equal, adding excess inventory decreases the probability of 
entering the backlog regime where the system is intrinsically less stable.  So, even if the source of 
perceived risk is something other than (or in addition to) coordination risk (e.g., trusting the demand 
information or other aspects of the experimental setting), then adding excess inventory can still be 
beneficial in reducing the bullwhip effect.  Also, while excess inventory reduces order oscillation, one 
could argue that the improvement comes at the expense of increased costs as participants hold larger 
inventories. Whether adding coordination stock is beneficial from a cost perspective depends on the 
underlying cost parameters. 
                                                
9Teams 6, 7 and 10 were removed as outliers. Including them yields σι > σι 1 in 63% of the cases, and the p-value falls to 0.051.   
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Figure 6:  Standard Deviation of Orders in Experiment 4 (Adding Coordination Stock) 
Specifically, one must trade off the cost of holding a larger buffer inventory (coordination stock) against 
the cost of increased inventory spikes and backlogs without the buffer.  For our experimental setting, 
where the unit backlog cost is twice the unit holding cost, the median total supply chain cost with 
coordination stock is $1,890, significantly lower than the median total cost of $9,151 without 
coordination stock (Mann-Whitney p = 0.0065).10 Here, at least, the cost of holding coordination stock is 
more than offset by the lower costs resulting from greater stability.  Our setting (where unit backlog cost 
is at least twice that of unit holding cost) is representative of industries where stockouts not only lead to 
lost sales but also erode a firm’s reputation as a reliable supplier, potentially leading to loss of market 
share, lower prices, and other costs. However, if unit holding costs exceed backlog cost, carrying 
additional inventory may be prohibitively expensive even if it reduces supply chain instability. Such a 
situation may exist for perishable and customized goods, products with high embodied value-added, 
product variants ordered infrequently, and other settings where firms tend toward make-to-order 
strategies. 
To test the impact of excess inventory on the tendency to underweight the supply line, we again 
estimate the decision rule in equations (1) and (2). The median fraction of the inventory shortfall 
corrected each period is 0.26, and the median fraction of the supply line participants consider is 0.24, both 
substantially below the optimal values of 1.  Furthermore, 63% of the estimates of β are significantly less 
than the optimal value of one, 41% are not significantly different from zero and the best estimate is zero 
                                                
10 With the outlier teams the median standard deviation of orders in the baseline is 20.9 and here is 4.4, which are significantly different (Mann-
Whitney p = 0.032). The median total supply chain cost with outliers is 13,105 in the baseline and 2,840 here, and this difference is weakly 
significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.09).   
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for 19% of participants. Supply line underweighting persists. However the consequences of 
underweighting are lessened considerably by the addition of coordination stock. One reason is simply that 
the extra buffer means the supply chain operates farther from the unstable backlog regime. 
Comparing the parameters of the decision rule between experiments 1 and 4 (Table 2) suggests 
another source for the benefit of coordination stock.  The estimated values of α are lower in experiment 4, 
where participants begin with 12 units of on-hand inventory, than in experiment 1, where they begin with 
the optimal level of zero (a median of 0.26 vs. 0.47, respectively), although the difference is only 
marginally statistically significant (p = 0.066).  Why might participants be less aggressive when given 
coordination stock?  One possibility of course, is that, by chance, the participants in experiment 4 were 
calmer by disposition than those in experiment 1.  Alternatively, the participants may have reacted to the 
situation.  With the standard cost structure we use, backlogs are more costly than on-hand inventory.  
When initial inventory is zero, even a small increase in incoming orders creates a costly backlog, perhaps 
triggering an aggressive effort to return to nonnegative on-hand inventory.  However, with initial 
inventory of 12, the same small jump in incoming orders will leave the participant with positive on-hand 
inventory, avoiding the costly backlog regime.  Participants may therefore not feel as much urgency to 
order in the presence of coordination stock.   
As an analogy, consider driving.  You seek to maintain a certain distance between your car and the 
car ahead, analogous to the desired on-hand inventory level in the supply chain.  Although you know that 
the speed limit is (say) 55 miles per hour, and although this is common knowledge, you cannot trust the 
driver ahead of you to maintain a steady speed of 55.  You must often adjust your speed to maintain a safe 
distance between you and the car ahead, accelerating when the distance grows, and easing off the gas or 
applying the brake when the distance shrinks below the safe level. As in supply chains, the velocity of 
your car responds to your control actions with a lag.  And, as in the beer game, costs are asymmetric:  the 
cost of a larger gap than you desire between you and the car ahead is small, while the cost of “backlog” 
(rear-ending the car in front of you) is very high.  Drivers who tailgate must brake aggressively when the 
distance to the car ahead shrinks (that is, use a large α), while drivers with a large buffer between 
themselves and the car ahead can simply ease off the gas (use a smaller α).  That is, the gain of the 
negative feedback through which drivers control the distance to the car ahead is a nonlinear function of 
the distance.  We hypothesize that, at least with the cost structure used here, participants who find 
themselves close to the costly backlog regime, as in experiment 1, are likely to order more aggressively 
than those who are given an initial buffer, as in experiment 4.  The contrast between the estimated values 
of α in these experiments is consistent with the “tailgating” theory, but further experiments would be 
needed to test for the hypothesized nonlinear dependence of α on net inventory and the cost structure. 
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5.  General Discussion and Psychological Mechanisms 
The contributions of this paper are both conceptual and empirical.  First, we identified coordination risk 
as a possible new behavioral cause of the bullwhip effect in supply chains.  Second, we presented 
experimental evidence demonstrating that reducing factors contributing to coordination risk moderates the 
bullwhip effect.  Third, we introduced a successful managerial intervention, showing that carrying 
coordination stock to buffer the system against strategic uncertainty improves performance.   
 However, the more basic question regarding the psychological processes through which these effects 
operate remains open.  While identifying the psychological foundations of the phenomenon was not our 
objective, we can shed some light on possible mechanisms using the data we have collected.  
5.1  Does the Presence of Coordination Risk Create Supply Line Underweighting? 
The first possibility is that reducing coordination risk reduces supply line underweighting. Studies show 
that people have great difficulty managing complex dynamic systems, typically failing to account for 
feedback processes, underweighting time delays, and misunderstanding stocks and flows (Sterman 1994, 
Booth Sweeney and Sterman 2000). Underweighting the supply line of unfilled orders in stock 
management tasks such as the beer game is particularly common.  
 Sterman (1989a) discusses explanations for supply line underweighting grounded in the theory of 
bounded rationality and behavioral decision making (Simon 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982).  Research shows that people tend to ignore or underestimate time 
delays in dynamical systems (Sterman 1989a, Dörner 1996).  If people’s mental models do not include 
the delay between placing and receiving orders, they may simply be unaware that they should account for 
on-order inventory in order decisions, even if, as in the present experiment, that information is available.  
If so, providing people with the optimal policy, which explicitly instructs them to consider all on-order 
inventories, should eliminate, or at least reduce, supply line underweighting.   Alternatively, people may 
know that they should take the supply line into account, but find it difficult to do so due to cognitive 
limitations such as limited attention, working memory, and mental computation capability (Simon 1997; 
Plous 1993).  One must not only recognize the importance of the supply line, but direct attentional 
resources to monitoring it and incorporating it in the decision heuristic.  If people understand the 
importance of the supply line, but face cognitive limits that prevent them from accounting for it, then 
reducing the cognitive load of the task should free up working memory and attentional resources for that 
purpose, reducing supply line underweighting.   
 The cognitive resources available to attend to the supply line should be the smallest in experiments 1 
and 4, where the optimal ordering policy is not common knowledge.  Cognitive resources should increase 
when players are given common knowledge of the optimal policy (experiment 2), and increase further 
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when players are guaranteed that all others in the supply chain will in fact play the optimal policy 
(experiment 3).  Consequently, if cognitive limitations contribute to supply line underweighting, the 
estimated values of β should be lowest in experiments 1 and 4, higher in experiment 2, and highest in 
experiment 3.  
 To test these hypotheses we compare the estimated values of β across experiments. In experiment 1 
the median value of β is extremely low (0.08), indicating that many subjects essentially ignored the 
supply line altogether.  The median value of β in experiment 2 is nearly identical (0.10) and there is no 
statistically significant difference compared to experiment 1 (Mann-Whitney p = 0.63). Providing people 
with the optimal policy does not reduce supply line underweighting.  Adding trust by automating all 
players but one (experiment 3) frees up additional cognitive resources because players know and need not 
speculate on how their partners will behave.  However, although the median value of β rises to 0.14 the 
difference compared to experiment 1 is not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.27), and it 
remains far below the optimal value of 1.  The hypothesis that eliminating coordination risk by requiring 
others to use the optimal policy will reduce supply line underweighting is not supported.  The highest 
estimates of β are found in the coordination stock condition (experiment 4), in which participants are not 
informed of the optimal policy:  the median estimate of β in experiment 4 is 0.24, though these values are 
also not significantly different than those in experiment 1 (Mann-Whitney p = 0.14).  Overall, there is no 
evidence that providing common knowledge of the optimal policy or even guaranteeing that others will 
use it reduces supply line underweighting.   
 We are left to conclude that (1) the fraction of the supply line participants take into account remains 
far below the optimal level in all experimental conditions, and (2) the performance improvements induced 
by reducing coordination risk are at best only weakly related to the degree of supply line underweighting.  
These results are consistent with prior work.  For example, Sterman (1989b) and Diehl and Sterman 
(1995) show underweighting is robust in one-person stock management tasks where by definition there 
are no strategic interactions among players and hence no issues of coordination risk.  It is possible that the 
complexity of those tasks still overwhelmed people’s cognitive capacities, but subsequent experiments 
with far simpler systems show similar errors (e.g., Booth Sweeney and Sterman 2000, Cronin, Gonzalez 
and Sterman 2009).  Prior research suggests that people suffer from deeper, more persistent difficulties in 
understanding and controlling dynamical systems, including difficulties understanding feedback 
processes, time delays, accumulations, and nonlinearities (Sterman 1994, 2011).  All of these elements of 
dynamic complexity are present in the beer game and play important roles in its dynamics.  
5.2  Does the Presence of Coordination Risk Cause Spontaneous Deviations? 
The second possibility is that reducing coordination risk would reduce the tendency of individuals to 
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deviate from optimal ordering in the first place.  Conceptually, one can distinguish between (1) the 
stability of the system’s response to perturbations, caused by underweighting the supply line, and (2) the 
sources of perturbations that trigger the response.  
In previous experimental studies using the beer game, exogenous perturbations such as unanticipated 
changes in customer demand or random variations in production and deliveries served as triggers that 
knocked the system out of equilibrium, allowing any biases or errors in decision making such as supply 
line underweighting to be observed.  Here there are no such exogenous perturbations.  Instead, agents 
who suspect their customers or suppliers will make poor decisions may endogenously choose to deviate 
from the equilibrium strategy to build a buffer stock against the coordination risk of non-optimal behavior 
by others, thus causing variability in the orders they impose on their suppliers. Note that such behavior is 
fundamentally different from supply line underweighting, which causes fluctuations and amplification in 
response to perturbations. We define a spontaneous deviation as a player ordering a quantity different 
from the optimal value of 4 cases before experiencing any change in incoming orders, deliveries, or 
inventory. If this mechanism drives the results, then removing the sources of coordination risk should 
dampen bullwhip behavior by reducing the likelihood and magnitude of spontaneous deviations.   
 In experiment 1, 72% of participants spontaneously deviated from the equilibrium order of 4, and 
74% of these did so in the first period. Of those who spontaneously deviated, 74% ordered more than four 
cases; on average, those deviating spontaneously ordered an extra 2.6 cases above the equilibrium 
throughput of 4.  However, the likelihood of spontaneous deviation in Experiment 2 (when coordination 
risk is reduced) is almost identical, 75%.  Like experiment 1, the vast majority of spontaneous deviations 
occur in the first period (83%) and 93% of those doing so order more than four cases.  The average excess 
order, 6.3 cases, is even larger than in experiment 1.  The likelihood and magnitude of spontaneous 
deviations are not significantly lower in experiment 2 than in experiment 1.  Spontaneous deviations are 
almost identical in experiment 3 (69% of participants spontaneously deviate and the average deviation is 
3.9 cases), which is not significantly different than the frequency or size of spontaneous deviations in 
experiment 1.  Thus, the likelihood and extent of spontaneous deviation cannot explain the improved 
performance. 
5.3  Does Coordination Risk Cause Overreaction to Inventory Shortfalls? 
Coordination risk might also operate by affecting people’s responses to inventory shortfalls.  If decision 
makers believe that their counterparts will make rational decisions (because those counterparts are either 
informed of, or constrained to follow, the optimal ordering rule), then an inventory shortfall is not a cause 
for alarm.  Thus individuals in treatments with reduced coordination risk may be less likely to over-react 
to inventory shortfalls by placing excess orders. 
25 
 
 To test this possibility, we compared the estimated values of α across the experimental treatments.   
The median estimate of α in experiment 1 is 0.47, while in experiment 2 (with coordination risk 
decreased), the median value is 0.28.  While the difference is not statistically significant (Mann Whitney 
p = 0.12), the magnitude of the drop is large and has a substantial impact on costs, amplification, and 
oscillation.  
 To illustrate, simulating the system with the decision rule in equations (1)-(2) using the median 
estimated parameters for experiment 1 in all four positions yields a large cycle with amplitude growing 
over the first 48 weeks.11  The first peak in orders for each link in the chain is 6, 8, 13, and 16 cases for the 
R, W, D and F (respectively); total costs are $1650.  Reducing α to 0.28, the median value in experiment 
2—with all other parameters unchanged—cuts initial peak orders to 5, 7, 9, and 10, respectively.  Peak 
factory orders drop 38% and total costs fall to $1332, a drop of 19%.  Thus, although the differences in the 
estimated values of α between experiments 1 and 2 are only directional, they are consistent with our 
observed results that common knowledge decreases order oscillation and amplification. 
We find a similar result comparing experiments 1 and 3.  The median estimate of α in experiment 3 is 
0.24; the difference between this and experiment 1 is marginally significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.067).  
Simulating the system with the median parameters from experiment 3 for one player and the optimal 
policy for the roles that were automated essentially eliminates amplification and oscillation, as observed 
in the data.  In experiment 4 the median estimate of α is 0.26; again, marginally different from experiment 
1 (Mann-Whitney p = 0.09).   
 Although the evidence is of marginal statistical significance, it appears that common knowledge of 
the optimal policy, a guarantee that others will use it, or coordination stock to buffer players against the 
risk of non-optimal behavior by others reduces how aggressively participants respond to a given inventory 
discrepancy.  Since players in all conditions significantly underweight the supply line, the reduction in the 
gain of the inventory control feedback causes oscillation and amplification to drop.  In terms of the 
tailgating analogy in section 5.1, a driver who fears that the cars ahead may slam on their brakes for no 
apparent reason must be prepared to react aggressively, while drivers who can trust that the cars ahead 
will not behave erratically can react less aggressively.  
 The persistence of the bullwhip effect, supply line underweighting, and spontaneous deviations 
despite the experimental treatments is consistent with recent research in judgment and decision making 
(e.g., Kahneman 2002, Gigerenzer et al. 1999) and neuroscience (e.g., McClure et al. 2004, Camerer et. 
al. 2005) stressing the role of unconscious, intuitive processes.  Imaging studies show that decision tasks 
involving long time frames or purely economic considerations tend to activate brain regions associated 
                                                
11 The system is perturbed from equilibrium because the estimated target inventory level, S’, is not the equilibrium value.  The estimated values of 
players’ desired inventory levels induce the spontaneous deviations that knock the system out of equilibrium.   
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with deliberation, such as the frontal cortex, while tasks involving immediate needs and emotionally-
laden contexts tend to activate the limbic system.  These intuitive processes are often adaptive in settings 
similar to those in which they evolved, but can lead to error and bias in novel contexts.  When humans 
evolved, complex artificial systems like supply chains did not exist.  Resource scarcity placed a high 
premium on immediate, certain rewards compared to delayed, uncertain rewards.  As shown in studies of 
hyperbolic discounting (e.g., McClure et al. 2004), people strongly prefer the “bird in the hand” and 
discount future rewards.  In the beer game context, such preferences would lead to underweighting of the 
supply line of on-order inventory compared to on-hand inventory.  Similarly, when humans evolved, 
social interactions frequently involved coordination risk: there were no automated agents guaranteed to 
use optimal decision rules.  The supply chain context may trigger unconscious fears that others either 
don’t know or won’t use the optimal rule, even when people are informed of it or know that the other 
agents are programmed to use it.  If so, the result is likely to be spontaneous deviations as players order 
more than the equilibrium throughput in an attempt to build coordination stock.  We speculate that the 
robustness of supply line underweighting and spontaneous deviations in the experiment may arise in 
neural structures distinct from those responsible for the deliberative processes underlying rational choice.  
Further work investigating the psychological and neural processes at work is needed to test these 
hypotheses. 
5.4  Does Supply Line Underweighting Affect the Aggressiveness of Inventory Corrections? 
As discussed above, a participant who fully accounts for the supply line of on-order inventory (β = 1) 
should order the full discrepancy between desired and actual total inventory each period (α = 1). Because 
there are no adjustment costs in the experiment, setting α = 1 when β = 1 corrects any inventory gap as 
quickly as possible without unintended inventory overshoot.  However, if participants underweight the 
supply line (β < 1), then large values of α cause severe instability, while smaller values reduce 
amplification, oscillation and costs (Thomsen et al. 1992, Mosekilde 1996).  In control-theoretic terms, α 
is the gain of the negative feedback regulating inventory; the lower the value of β, the lower the gain of 
that feedback (the smaller the α) must be to prevent costly oscillations.  Although the experimental results 
clearly show participants did not respond to inventory discrepancies using the joint optimal values α, 
β = 1, the typical value of α in each experiment is much less than one (Table 2).  Are the low values of α a 
result of participants approximating the optimal response to inventory shortfalls conditioned on the degree 
of supply line underweighting they exhibited?  
To shed light on this question, we computed the conditionally optimal value of α given the value of 
β, denoted α*(β), for the setting of experiment 4.  Values of α*(β) were determined from simulations of 
the full supply chain using the decision rule in equations (1) and (2), assuming that all ordering rule 
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parameters other than α and β were optimal.  Figure 7 shows the resulting values of α*(β).  As prior 
research and the discussion above suggest, α*(β) falls sharply as β decreases.12  Figure 7 also plots the 
estimated values of α and β for participants in experiment 4 (excluding outliers). The estimated values do 
not appear to conform to α*(β). The correlation between α and β is small (r = .25) and not statistically 
significant (p = .21); including outliers yields essentially no correlation (r = .007, p = .96).  The data do 
not support the hypothesis that participants’ order decisions in experiment 4 were consistent with the 
conditionally optimal responsiveness to inventory shortfalls given the degree of supply line 
underweighting they exhibited. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Estimated α and β, experiment 4, with conditionally optimal value of α as a function of β.   
Conditionally optimal values of α were derived from simulations of the supply chain model under the conditions of experiment 4, using the 
decision rule in equations (1) and (2) and assuming optimal parameters for all links in the chain (θ = 0, implying that the demand forecast is 
accurate at all times at 4 cases/week, and target inventory for each link is set to optimal levels of on-hand and on-order inventory). To reduce the 
dimensionality of the parameter space, all four simulated participants are assumed to use the same values of α and β.  Estimated values shown 
exclude outliers. 
 
The other experimental conditions exhibit the same pattern.  Figure 8 shows the estimated (α, β) 
values for participants in experiments 1, 2 and3. There is considerable scatter in all three experiments, 
with α spanning a wide range of values for any given value of β. The correlation between the estimated 
values of α and β for participants in these experiments is small (r = .16) and not statistically significant (p 
= .12); including outliers yields the same result (r = .13, p = .16). The evidence does not support the 
                                                
12 The exact values of the function α*(β) plotted in Figure 7 depend on the assumptions that the other parameters in the decision rule (θ, S’) are 
optimal and that initial inventory is 12 cases for all participants (as in experiment 4). Other assumptions and initial conditions will cause the 
values of α*(β) to vary, though in all cases the conditionally optimal value of α decreases with β (Thomsen et al. 1992, Mosekilde 1996).   
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hypothesis that participants responded to inventory shortfalls optimally, conditional on the degree of 
supply line underweighting they exhibited.  
 
 
Figure 8:  Estimated values of α and β in experiments 1-3 (outliers excluded). 
 
5.5  Do Participants Engage in Hoarding Behavior? 
The decision rule defined by equations (1) and (2)  assumes constant desired levels of on-hand and on-
order inventory.  However, it is plausible that these target stock levels may vary endogenously with the 
state of the system.  For example, when suppliers are unable to fill orders, delivery times rise and 
customers receive less than they desire.  Customers in real supply chains sometimes respond by seeking 
larger safety stocks (hoarding) and by ordering more from suppliers, often through multiple channels 
(placing phantom orders).  Hoarding and phantom orders can be rational when multiple customers 
compete for limited supplies, when capacity constraints constrain deliveries, and when there are supply 
interruptions or other stochastic shocks (Lee et al. 1997, Cachon and Lariviere 1999, Armony and 
Plambeck 2005).  In our experimental setting, participants experience endogenous shocks due to the 
unanticipated ordering patterns of other supply chain members.  Participants may be adjusting their target 
stock level in response to such shocks, effectively inducing hoarding and phantom ordering behavior.  To 
test for the presence of hoarding and phantom ordering formally, however, requires relaxing the 
assumption of constant desired on-hand and on-order inventory levels in the ordering decision rule 
(equations (1) and (2)).  For example, a participant, knowing that all members of the supply chain have 
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common knowledge that demand is constant, might initially attempt to maintain the optimal stock of on-
hand and on-order inventory.  However, if that participant received a large order, or less than they expect 
to receive from their supplier, they may revise their beliefs and increase the level of on-hand and on-order 
stocks they seek, leading to additional orders.  To test this hypothesis, one of the authors of this study has 
estimated decision rules in which participants endogenously vary the levels of on-hand and on-order 
inventory they seek based on their beliefs about incoming orders, supplier lead times, and other factors 
indicating scarcity.  The full study is available on request.  In brief, the revised ordering rule is: 
                    Ot =max 0, Dte +αS St* − St( )+αSL SLt* − SLt( )+εt( )     (3) 
where target on-hand inventory, S*, and target supply line of on-order inventory, SL*, are functions of 
expected demand, De (defined by exponential smoothing of actual incoming orders, as in equation (2)) 
and expected supplier lead time, λe (estimated from the current supply line and the rate of deliveries 
received from the supplier).  For example, participants may set target on-hand inventory to a certain 
number of weeks coverage, c, of expected incoming orders De: 
                                                        St* = cDte                                              (4) 
where target inventory coverage, c, may be either constant or proportional to the participant’s belief about 
the supplier lead time. Similarly, to ensure a steady flow of deliveries from the supplier, participants 
must, following Little’s Law, set the target supply line of on order inventory equal to λe weeks worth of 
their forecast of incoming orders, 
                                                        SLt* = λteDte .      (5)   
 Full exposition of the models, results and sensitivity analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
In brief, for approximately 80% of participants the modified model does not significantly improve 
explanatory power.  However, for the remaining 20% there is strong evidence of hoarding and/or 
phantom ordering: the hypothesis that target on-hand and on-order stock levels are constant is rejected 
and the enhanced model significantly improves R2 and lowers the root mean square error (RMSE) 
between the model and data.  The improvement is particularly large for those participants classified here 
as outliers.   
 Figure 9 illustrates two examples: the wholesaler and distributor from the most extreme outlier team 
in the data, Team 4 in Experiment 1 (shown in Figure 2).  Although the retailer’s orders never exceeded 
36 cases/week, the wholesaler’s orders reached a peak of 30,000 cases in a single week; the distributor’s 
orders peak at 20,000 cases/week.  The original decision rule with constant target stock levels cannot 
explain such extreme behavior.  However, incorporating hoarding and phantom ordering into the model 
significantly improves the fit to the data, boosting R2 from less than 0.05 to more than 0.70, and reducing 
the RMSE by 46% for the wholesaler and 59% for the distributor.  The estimated parameters suggest 
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these participants reacted to the jump in incoming orders by increasing target levels for on-hand inventory 
and by increasing the target supply line of on-order inventory as their supplier’s lead time lengthened. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Fit to participant behavior of modified decision rule incorporating hoarding and phantom orders. 
 
 Why did a fifth of the participants engage in hoarding and phantom ordering when it is not rational to 
do so in the experiments reported here?  Following the discussion in section 5.3, we conjecture that these 
behaviors are adaptive in situations characterized by scarcity and competition for resources, such as those 
in which humans evolved, and may be embedded in neural structures in the limbic system, such as those 
that appear to lead to hyperbolic discounting.  We speculate that hoarding and phantom ordering may be 
triggered by the stress caused by unexpectedly large incoming orders or lags in supplier deliveries even 
though such behavior is not rational in the experimental setting.  Further research is needed to test these 
hypotheses. 
 
6  Limitations and Conclusions  
Table 3 summarizes the results of our four experiments, showing which differences in order oscillation 
and other measures of interest are statistically significant.  
Four main findings emerge from the experiments.  
1. The “bullwhip effect” and supply line underweighting persist even when demand is constant and 
known to all (i.e., when there is common knowledge of demand).  This controlled setting provides 
stronger evidence, as compared with previous experimental research, that the bullwhip effect is, in 
part, a behavioral phenomenon.   
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
0 10 20 30 40 50
O
rd
er
s 
(c
as
es
/w
ee
k)
Week
Subject 174 (W, Experiment 1)
_____  Actual Orders
. . . . . Original Model
- - - -  Hoarding Model
RMSER2
48630.00Original Model
26260.71Hoarding Model
-46%0.71Δ
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
0 10 20 30 40 50
O
rd
er
s 
(c
as
es
/w
ee
k)
Week
Subject 175 (D, Experiment 1)
_____  Actual Orders
. . . . . Original Model
- - - -  Hoarding Model
RMSER2
46600.04Original Model
19190.84Hoarding Model
-59%0.80Δ
31 
 
2. We identify coordination risk as a possible new source of uncertainty that may both trigger and 
further amplify bullwhip behavior.  We test the impact of two factors that may reduce coordination 
risk, a lack of common knowledge of the optimal strategy and a lack of trust that others will follow 
the optimal ordering policy.  
 
3. Performance is improved through the introduction of common knowledge and the addition of 
trust, although these factors do not reduce the behavioral tendency to underweight the supply line.   
 
4. Performance is similarly improved by adding coordination stock,  which buffers against strategic 
uncertainty.  
 
Building on our notion of coordination risk, Su (2008) provides an analytical proof that such risk can 
lead to bullwhip behavior when the decision maker is boundedly rationality.  Su’s result holds when there 
is no information lag and orders are filled immediately (i.e. without the potential for error introduced by 
supply line underweighting).  These results are consistent with our experimental findings and together 
provide strong evidence that coordination risk can inhibit supply chain performance. 
 
 
Measures of  
Orders Placed 
Experiment 1:  
Baseline 
 
(Retailers only) 
Experiment 2: 
Creating Common 
Knowledge 
(Retailers only) 
Experiment 3: 
Eliminating 
Coordination Risk 
Experiment 4: 
Adding 
Coordination 
Stock 
Significance tests: 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.10 
Outlier teams excluded 
Median std 
deviation 
15.7 
(Retailers =3.9) 
5.4 
(Retailers = 2.5) 
1.7 3.8 1 > 2**  
1 > 3** 
2 = 3 
1 > 4** 
 
Average std 
deviation 
20.6 
(Retailers = 4.7) 
8.3 
(Retailers = 5.5) 
1.9 4.5 
Median Total 
Supply Chain 
Cost 
9,151 
(Retailers =336) 
3,396 
(Retailers = 122) 
47 1,890 1 > 2* 
1 > 3** 
2 > 3* 
1 > 4** 
 
Average Total 
Supply Chain 
Cost 
10,771 
(Retailers =546) 
4,562 
(Retailers = 202) 
147 2,157 
Outlier teams included 
Median std 
deviation 
20.9 
(Retailers =3.9) 
 
5.4 
(Retailers = 2.5) 
1.9 4.4 1 > 2** 
1 > 3** 
2 = 3 
1 > 4** 
 
Average std 
deviation 
455.1 
(Retailers =4.5) 
8.3 
(Retailers = 5.5) 
2.3 57.8 
Median Total 
Supply Chain 
Cost 
13,105 
(Retailers =279) 
 
3,396 
(Retailers = 122) 
54 2,840 1 > 2** 
1 > 3** 
2 > 3* 
1 > 4** 
 
Average Total 
Supply Chain 
Cost 
202,646 
(Retailers =463) 
4,562 
(Retailers = 202) 
159 14,101 
 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis for Experiments 1 and 2 are for retailers only, and are used to compare with Experiment 3. 
Note:  To derive these summary statistics we first calculated each individual’s standard deviation of orders placed.  We then calculated the 
median (average) standard deviation of orders placed separately for each role (R, W, D, F).  Finally, we took the average of these medians 
(averages) to report as the summary statistic in the table and the text of the paper. 
 
Table 3:   Supply chain costs and metrics of order amplification 
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All research has limitations and ours is no exception. These limitations also suggest directions for 
future research. First, we used students as participants, as is common practice in experimental economics. 
It is possible that experienced supply chain professionals would perform better, although there is no 
evidence of any systematic differences due to the subject pool.  For example, Croson and Donohue (2006) 
report beer game results from supply chain managers and find similar patterns of bullwhip and 
underweighting of the supply line. Croson (2007) provides an overview of research from experimental 
economics and other fields on the use of student versus professional subjects.  She reports only a very few 
settings where professional participants perform significantly differently than student participants. 
Croson and Donohue (2006), and Wu and Katok (2006) provide some initial insight into the effects of 
learning from experience. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that experience is unlikely to eliminate 
the bullwhip effect by itself. Managers who experience instability may conclude that others in their 
supply chain are unreliable, motivating them to deviate sooner or more from optimal play so as to build 
up coordination stock as a buffer. Further research on the role of experience, learning, and decision aids 
(e.g., Wu and Katok 2006) is clearly needed.  
The specific choice of initial conditions and parameters suggests other extensions. Although there is 
no a priori reason to think so, it is possible that different cost parameters or initial inventory levels might 
lead to different outcomes.  
As described above, the decision rule estimated here assumes constant levels for target on-hand and 
on-order inventory.  These assumptions can be relaxed to test whether at least some participants 
endogenously increased the levels of coordination stock they sought to accumulate when faced with a 
surge in incoming orders or a drop in supplier delivery reliability.  Preliminary work suggests that some 
participants in the experiment did so, and that a model incorporating behavioral responses to order 
volatility and supply disruptions explains the behavior of many participants classified as outliers.  Further 
exploration of the conditions that trigger such hoarding, and empirical investigation into whether such 
behavioral responses to scarcity and volatility exist in real supply chains, offers a promising avenue for 
further research. 
Finally, experiment 3 provides a starting point to investigate how people interact with artificial agents 
programmed to follow specific decision rules.  While our agents were programmed to follow the cost-
minimizing decision rule, further research could explore participants’ responses to agents programmed to 
use other rules, including suboptimal rules or rules estimated from the behavior of human players.  
Our work suggests three managerial insights. First, we demonstrate that the bullwhip effect is a 
behavioral phenomenon as well as an operational one, and therefore methods for reducing supply chain 
instability should address the behavioral as well as structural causes of the problem. Decision makers 
have a difficult time controlling systems that include feedbacks and delays, so training and decision aids 
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that help them do so may lead to substantial improvement.  
Second, the notion of “optimal” behavior is contingent on people’s assumptions about the thinking 
and behavior of the other agents with whom they interact. If a person believes that their counterparts will 
behave in an unpredictable and capricious fashion, this may lead to further instability in the supply chain.  
To the extent that managers can be assured of their supply chain partners’ knowledge of the optimal 
decision rule and trust them to implement it, performance can improve further.   
Our final contribution is the preliminary identification of an effective mechanism to moderate the 
bullwhip effect: coordination stock.  The results suggest a previously unidentified purpose for excess 
stock.  Intuitively, the optimal level of coordination stock depends on the level of coordination risk, the 
cost of holding excess inventory, and the cost of not dampening the bullwhip effect. Additional 
experiments would be needed to further define the nature of these relationships.  This represents a fertile 
area for future research.  
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Appendix:  Outlier Analysis 
 
To test for outliers, we used Grubb’s procedure, also known as the maximum normed residual test (Grubbs 
1969), as recommended in the Engineering Statistics Handbook (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology; www.nist.gov). This procedure involves calculating the variance of orders placed over the 
entire game for each individual and comparing these variances to those of others in the same 
role/experiment category (e.g., all retailers within experiment 1). The Grubbs procedure then identifies 
outliers within each role/experiment category based on simple criteria; distance of an observation from the 
mean in terms of standard deviation. In our case, an individual was flagged as an outlier if its variance of 
orders was more than 2.29 standard deviations beyond the mean variance (which is consistent with a 
statistical significance of p=.05). For example, out of the 10 retailers in experiment 3, one had a variance of 
orders placed of 37.36.  This is 2.39 standard deviations beyond the mean variance, and so this individual 
was identified as an outlier. For the all-human experiments (i.e. experiments 1, 2 and 4), a team was 
eliminated if two or more of its members did not pass the criterion. For the experiments with one human 
and three automated team members (i.e., experiment 3), a team was eliminated if its single subject did not 
pass the criterion. Table A.1 lists the individuals identified as outliers, and the number of teams eliminated 
as a result, for each experiment. 
 
 Experiment 1: 
Baseline 
Experiment 2: 
Creating Common 
Knowledge 
Experiment 3: 
Eliminating 
Coordination Risk 
Experiment 4: Adding 
Coordination  
Stock 
 
Outliers 
by Role  
(team #) 
 
 
Retailer (5) 
 
Wholesaler (4) 
Distributor (4) 
Factory (4) 
 
Distributor (9) 
Factory (9) 
 
Retailer (8) 
 
Distributor (7) 
 
Retailer (18) 
 
Wholesaler (27) 
 
Factory (1) 
 
Factory (5) 
 
 
Distributor (6) 
Factory (6) 
 
Retailer (7) 
Wholesaler (7) 
Distributor (7) 
Factory (7) 
 
Retailer (10) 
Wholesaler (10) 
 
 
Eliminated 
Teams 
 
 
Teams 4, 9 
 
None 
 
Individuals 1, 5, 18, 
27 
 
Teams 6, 7, 10 
Note: The ID number/team number of each outlier player is listed in parenthesis. 
 
Table A.1. Breakdown of Individual Outliers and Eliminated Teams 
 
